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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Faded Lines: Another Attempt to Delineate
Reasonableness in Automobile Searches Incident to Arrest; Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
Devon M. Stiles*

INTRODUCTION
On August 25, 1999, Tucson police dispatched two ofﬁcers to investigate a
residence implicated by an anonymous tip as the site of a drug-dealing operation.1
Upon answering the door, the respondent Rodney Gant identiﬁed himself and
informed the ofﬁcers he expected the owner of the household to return later.2
The ofﬁcers left and checked Gant’s background, discovering he had a suspended
driver’s license.3 The ofﬁcers returned to the residence later and arrested two
individuals: one for providing a false name and the other for possession of drug
paraphernalia.4
Shortly thereafter, another man arrived in a car; the ofﬁcers recognized the
car as belonging to Gant.5 After Gant exited his vehicle, the police arrested him
for driving on a suspended license.6 After handcufﬁng Gant, the police placed
him in the backseat of a patrol car and called for additional ofﬁcers to assist at
the crime scene.7 After the additional ofﬁcers arrived on the scene, the police
searched Gant’s car.8 The ofﬁcers found Gant’s jacket on the backseat of his car,
searched the pockets of the jacket, found a bag of cocaine, and charged him with
possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.9 After
Gant’s failed attempt to suppress the evidence at trial, his subsequent conviction
and numerous appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted Gant’s petition
for certiorari.10
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2011. I would like to thank
Lisa Rich, Kevin Marshall, Allen Johnson and the members of the Wyoming Law Review Board for
their tremendous assistance throughout this process. I would also like to thank my wife Megan for
her enduring love, patience, and support.
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In a 5 to 4 decision, the Gant majority issued two holdings reinterpreting the
existing federal cases guiding police practices in automobile searches made
incident to arrest, thus creating a new bright-line rule.11 The ﬁrst holding served
to reinterpret and limit the boundaries set by the seminal case New York v. Belton.12
The second holding adopted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton v.
United States and established a new standard of suspicion to initiate automobile
searches incident to arrest.13
The two Gant holdings represent a radical departure from the past two
decades of Fourth Amendment automobile jurisprudence.14 This case note
critiques the two Gant holdings as lacking clarity and providing scant guidance
to law enforcement.15 The background section of this note details the history of
warrantless searches incident to arrest, focusing on three seminal United States
Supreme Court cases involving automobile searches incident to arrest: Chimel v.
California, New York v. Belton, and Thornton v. United States.16 Further, this note
outlines the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement,
established in United States v. Carroll, United States v. Ross, California v. Acevedo,
and Wyoming v. Houghton.17 Finally, after critiquing the two holdings in Gant, this
note advocates for a return to the probable cause standard and the adoption of the
automobile exception as an alternative to Gant’s unclear bright-line rule.18

BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures” and invokes probable cause

11

Id. at 1716–24.

12

See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (outlining the ﬁrst Gant holding).

13

See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (outlining the second Gant holding).

14

See infra notes 24–59, 105–36 and accompanying text (discussing the history of automobile
searches incident to arrest and the effects of the Gant ruling).
15
See infra notes 105–36 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clarity in the two
Gant holdings).
16
See infra notes 24–59 and accompanying text (outlining the federal bright-line approach to
Fourth Amendment challenges involving automobile searches incident to arrest which commence
without probable cause).
17
See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text (explaining the automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement which deﬁnes the boundaries of reasonableness in
automobile searches commencing with probable cause).
18

See infra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (arguing Gant’s lack of clarity provides scant
guidance to law enforcement); infra notes 137–54 and accompanying text (contending the probable
cause automobile exception solves the problems in Gant by simultaneously providing broad search
authority to police and limiting when law enforcement may commence searches).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/13

2

Stiles: Constitutional Law - Faded Lines: Another Attempt to Delineate Re

2010

CASE NOTE

321

as the baseline standard for determining reasonableness.19 Whether a search is
reasonable, however, requires a detailed factual analysis which balances a suspect’s
privacy interests with the government’s need to conduct a search.20
The United States Constitution proscribes warrantless searches as per se
unreasonable, subject to certain limited exceptions.21 Searches conducted by police
incident to the arrest of a suspect are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if
the searches adhere to a series of bright-line rules.22 The United States Supreme
Court originally created these rules to govern all warrantless searches occurring
incident to the arrest of a suspect, then later established a separate set of rules
governing searches incident to arrest if the searches speciﬁcally targeted the
vehicles of suspects.23

Searches Incident to Arrest
Nearly a century of jurisprudence deﬁnes the boundaries of reasonableness in
searches incident to arrest.24 In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court deﬁned reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, with no speciﬁc rule or test

19
See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1130–31 (1992) (discussing how the framers intended
the Fourth Amendment to protect Americans from writs of assistance and general warrants issued
in colonial times, which helped push the country toward the American Revolution).
20

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
534–37 (1967)).
21
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(“Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few speciﬁcally established
and well-delineated exceptions.”)). The Court has adopted numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement: investigative stops; frisks for weapons; stops of cars to check drivers’ licenses and
registration; customs searches of vehicles and persons at borders; luggage detention; mail detention;
special needs searches which make the warrant and probable cause requirements impossible; public
school searches; government workplace searches; searches of parolees; searches of businesses in
heavily regulated industries; searches of property in government safekeeping; drug testing; hot
pursuit; searches incident to arrest; and searches of vehicles with probable cause (the automobile
exception). See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
737, 753–65 (1992).
22
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the history
of searches incident to arrest).
23
Id.; see also Rachel Moran, Motorists Are People Too: Recalculating the Vehicular Search
Incident to Arrest Exception by Prohibiting Searches Incident to Arrest for Nonevidentiary Offenses, 44
NO. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 3 (2008) (outlining the history of the search incident to arrest doctrine
as applied to vehicles).

See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 6.3 (discussing the history of the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment); Cecil J. Jones, Jr., Thornton v. United States: Expanding the
Scope of Search Incident to Arrest on America’s Roadways, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 627, 631–38 (2007)
(providing an overview of the search incident to arrest exception).
24
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providing guidance.25 This trend ceased in 1950 with United States v. Rabinowitz,
which allowed police to search the entire premises surrounding a suspect if the
search commenced incident to the suspect’s arrest.26 In 1969, the Court overruled
Rabinowitz and established the ﬁrst bright-line rule governing searches incident
to arrest in Chimel v. California.27 Under Chimel, a search is unreasonable if the
police search outside the area in the suspect’s “immediate control,” deﬁned as the
area where the suspect could obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.28 Whether
Chimel permitted police to search the interior of a suspect’s vehicle incident to an
arrest remained unsettled.29

The Problem of Vehicles
The Court considered the challenge of deﬁning reasonableness in warrantless
automobile searches incident to arrest in New York v. Belton.30 In Belton, an ofﬁcer
stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a speeding violation.31 After approaching
3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 6.3; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment:
Internal Revenue Code or Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 960–75, 977–83,
988–1001 (2006) (detailing the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
25

26
3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 6.3 n.25 (citing Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751, 755
(1958)). In Smith, police ofﬁcers searched for drugs upstairs shortly after arresting the defendant
downstairs. Smith, 254 F.2d at 753. Since the police arrested the defendant downstairs, he could
never have gained access to the drugs upstairs or hindered the evidence-gathering process. Id.
However, in response to the defendant’s evidentiary challenge, the court quoted the majority in
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950):

[W]e cannot agree that [the requirement of procuring a warrant prior to a search]
should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search. It is
fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the
time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant.
Smith, 254 F.2d at 755. The court in Smith interpreted this as a rule preventing judges from
retrospectively judging the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest. Id. at 753–55.
27

See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 6.3 (summarizing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752

(1969)).
28
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768. The Chimel opinion addressed the increasing expansion of the
range in which the police could conduct a reasonable search incident to the arrest of a suspect. Id.
The majority argued once the boundary of reasonableness expands outside the immediate control of
the suspect, the distinction essentially becomes an artiﬁce attempting to maintain some semblance
of the Rabinowitz rationale. Id. at 759, 762–66. The Court could thus think of no rational reason
for police to search beyond an area where the suspect presented a danger to evidence or ofﬁcers. Id.
at 766. After police secured a suspect, they faced little risk in taking the time to obtain a warrant to
search the suspect’s premises since the suspect no longer presented a threat. Id. at 754–56, 763–68.

See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 7.1(a) (describing how lower courts would often overlook
the immediate control test in Chimel if the disputed search involved a vehicle).
29

30

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981); see also Carol A. Chase, Cars, Cops,
and Crooks: A Reexamination of Belton and Carroll With an Eye Toward Restoring Fourth Amendment
Privacy Protection to Automobiles, 85 OR. L. REV. 913, 913–18 (2006) (analyzing each opinion in
Belton).
31

Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
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the car and requesting the driver’s license and registration, the ofﬁcer smelled
burnt marijuana emanating from within the car and saw a bag on the ﬂoor of
the car labeled “Supergold,” which the ofﬁcer associated with marijuana.32 These
circumstances provided the ofﬁcer with probable cause to believe the occupants
of the vehicle illegally possessed marijuana.33 The ofﬁcer subsequently arrested
the defendant and the other individuals in the defendant’s car for possession
of marijuana.34 The ofﬁcer searched the vehicle after detaining the suspects
and discovered the defendant’s jacket in the back seat of the car.35 The ofﬁcer
discovered cocaine in the jacket pocket.36
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the search of his jacket,
alleging it commenced without probable cause and thus violated the Fourth
Amendment.37 In its holding, the United States Supreme Court found the search
reasonable, extending the Chimel immediate control rule to include passenger
compartments into which a “recent occupant” of the vehicle had access.38 Belton
thus expanded the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest to include the
entire car rather than merely the area where a suspect could destroy evidence or
harm ofﬁcers.39
In Thornton v. United States, the Court expanded the deﬁnition of “recent
occupant” to include any individuals, including passengers, who exited a vehicle
prior to detainment by ofﬁcers.40 The defendant in Thornton cautiously passed
an ofﬁcer while driving a Lincoln Town Car.41 The ofﬁcer subsequently checked
the car’s tags and found they were registered to a different make and model than
the defendant’s car.42 The ofﬁcer pursued, but the defendant parked the car and

32

Id. at 455–56.

33

Id. at 456.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 460 (“The police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the
passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in it be within his reach.”).
39
See Barry Kamins, Automobile Searches: Supreme Court Confesses Error, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17,
2009, at 3 (col. 1); Carson Emmons, Comment, Arizona v. Gant: An Argument for Tossing Belton
and All Its Bastard Kin, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1067, 1078–80 (2004) (discussing Belton).
40
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004); see also George Dery & Michael
J. Hernandez, Turning a Government Search Into a Permanent Power: Thornton v. United States and
the “Progressive Distortion” of Search Incident to Arrest, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 689–701
(2005) (discussing and critiquing the Court’s opinion in Thornton).
41

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617–18.

42

Id. at 618.
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exited the vehicle before the ofﬁcer stopped him.43 The defendant appeared
nervous and incoherent when the ofﬁcer confronted him in the parking lot.44
Upon consenting to a pat down search, which revealed a bulge in his pants, he
admitted to possessing narcotics.45 He then revealed two containers to the ofﬁcer:
one containing three bags of marijuana, and another containing a large amount
of crack cocaine.46 The ofﬁcer handcuffed the defendant, placed him in the patrol
car, and initiated a search of the defendant’s car.47 During the search, the ofﬁcer
discovered a handgun.48 The jury convicted Thornton of several crimes, including
possession of a ﬁrearm after having been previously convicted of a felony.49
In its ruling, the Thornton Court expanded the scope of reasonableness in
a search incident to arrest beyond the boundaries deﬁned in Belton.50 Similar to
Belton, this expansion allowed ofﬁcers to search anywhere in a vehicle the suspect
could have hidden evidence or weapons.51 However, the rule in Belton only
addressed searches that commenced incident to the arrest and forcible removal
of the defendant from the vehicle.52 In contrast, the Thornton Court expressly
rejected an analysis of whether the ofﬁcer made the arrest outside the vehicle or
forcibly removed the suspect from the vehicle prior to initiating the search.53 This
rendered irrelevant the temporal or spatial proximity of the suspect to the vehicle
at the time of the search, allowing police to expand the scope of a search incident
to arrest to include the suspect’s entire vehicle.54
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Thornton, joined by Justice
Ginsburg.55 Justice Scalia believed the Belton rule did not require an inquiry
into the Chimel dual interests of ofﬁcer safety and the preservation of evidence.56

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 620–21.

51

See Carson, supra note 39, at 1069–70 (describing how Belton expands the search incident
to arrest exception beyond the area of immediate control).
52

Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.

53

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620–21 (“There is simply no basis to conclude that the span of the
area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is determined by whether the arrestee exited
the vehicle at the ofﬁcer’s direction, or whether the ofﬁcer initiated contact with him while he
remained in the car.”).
54

Id.

55

Id. at 625–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).

56

Id. at 626–28.
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Instead, he reasoned the Belton rule allowed the type of broad, sweeping searches
authorized by Rabinowitz.57 He supported both the Rabinowitz and Chimel
interpretations of the search incident to arrest exception as constitutionally valid,
but found the Thornton majority’s attempts to tether Belton to Chimel functionally
disingenuous, since he found no examples of a defendant who successfully escaped
and gained access to a vehicle after detainment.58 He thus argued a reasonable
search incident to arrest commences when ofﬁcers have reason to believe evidence
of the crime of arrest exists in the vehicle at the time of the search.59

The Automobile Exception
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution mentions probable
cause as a standard of suspicion limiting when courts may issue warrants.60 Over
time, courts have interpreted the language of the Fourth Amendment to render
probable cause the baseline standard of suspicion required for reasonableness in
warrantless searches.61 Belton–Thornton addressed the scope of reasonableness
in a search incident to a suspect’s arrest when the searches commenced without
probable cause or a warrant.62 When ofﬁcers—absent a warrant—have probable
cause to believe evidence of a crime exists in a suspect’s vehicle, a different set of
case law applies, allowing ofﬁcers to search the entire vehicle and the contents of
passenger belongings for evidence of wrongdoing.63
The United States Supreme Court in the seminal case United States v. Carroll
ﬁrst established the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement allowing warrantless searches of a vehicle when law enforcement

57

Id. at 629; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Rabinowitz).

58

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625–26 (Scalia, J., concurring).

59

Id. at 630.

60

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or afﬁrmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

Id.
61

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806–09 (1982) (describing the history of the
probable cause standard); see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth
Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 637–45 (2008) (discussing
probable cause as a presumptive standard for searches and seizures).
62
See supra notes 30–59 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Belton–Thornton
bright-line approach).
63

See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text (discussing the cases underpinning the
automobile exception).
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ofﬁcers possess probable cause to search sufﬁcient to obtain a warrant.64 In United
States v. Ross, the Court expanded the automobile exception to allow searches
of the passenger compartments of vehicles.65 The Court afﬁrmed this expansion
in California v. Acevedo, holding that a search of a closed container in a vehicle
is reasonable when law enforcement ofﬁcers have probable cause to believe it
contains evidence or contraband.66
The Court fully expanded the automobile exception in Wyoming v. Houghton.67
In Houghton, an ofﬁcer pulled over a vehicle with a faulty brake light and noticed
a hypodermic needle in the driver’s front pocket.68 After leaving the vehicle at the
demand of the ofﬁcer, the driver admitted he used the needle to take drugs.69 The
ofﬁcer then ordered the two passengers, including Houghton, out of the vehicle.70
The ofﬁcer proceeded to search the vehicle and discovered Houghton’s purse, in
which he discovered a brown pouch containing methamphetamine.71 The ofﬁcer
also noticed hypodermic needle marks on Houghton’s arms and subsequently
arrested her for felony possession of methamphetamine.72 The Court held that
when an ofﬁcer has probable cause to search a suspect’s car for contraband,
the automobile exception allows the ofﬁcer to reasonably search any passenger’s
belongings found in the car at the time of the search.73

Wyoming’s Alternative Approach
When confronted with the dilemma of determining the reasonableness of
automobile searches incident to arrest, several states—including Wyoming—have

64
United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 155–57, 162 (1924) (holding when police
possess probable cause to believe evidence of a crime exists in a vehicle, sufﬁcient to procure a
warrant, the police may search the vehicle without ﬁrst obtaining a warrant); see also Alex Chan,
No, You May Not Search My Car! Extending Georgia v. Randolph to Vehicle Searches, 82 WASH. L.
REV. 377, 384–88 (2007) (outlining the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement).
65

Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (holding the automobile exception allows police to search
compartments in a vehicle, including the trunk, if the ofﬁcers have probable cause to believe
evidence or contraband is hidden somewhere in the vehicle, since a warrant issued by a court would
allow a full search of passenger compartments).
66
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991) (determining a warrantless search
commencing with probable cause may extend to closed containers capable of concealing evidence
or contraband).
67

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 307.
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chosen to adopt approaches different from the Belton–Thornton rule.74 Article
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution contains a provision similar to the Fourth
Amendment which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.75 In
Wyoming, defendants often challenge the reasonableness of automobile searches
incident to arrest under both Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.76 Challenges made under
the Wyoming Constitution adhere to a factor-based “reasonable under all the
circumstances” approach created in a series of Wyoming Supreme Court cases.77
However, any challenges made under the Fourth Amendment must now adhere
to Gant rather than Belton.78

PRINCIPAL CASE
After leaving the alleged drug house, police ofﬁcers discovered Gant’s
suspended license after a check of police records.79 When they returned later, Gant
arrived in his car, after which the police arrested him for driving on a suspended
license.80 After handcufﬁng and securing him in a police car, the ofﬁcers searched
his vehicle incident to his arrest.81 The ofﬁcers found Gant’s jacket on the back
seat and discovered cocaine in the jacket pocket.82 The state charged Gant

74
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718 n.8 (referencing all relevant case law from the states which decided
to repudiate Belton–Thornton in favor of alternative approaches).
75

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4. The Wyoming Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by afﬁdavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.

Id.
76

See, e.g., Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368, 371–72, 380–82 (Wyo. 2008); Pierce v. State,
171 P.3d 525, 529, 531–32 (Wyo. 2007); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 481–83 (Wyo. 1999)
(challenging the reasonableness of searches under both Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
77
See Kenneth Decock & Erin Mercer, Comment, Balancing the Scales of Justice: How
Will Vasquez v. State Affect Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest in Wyoming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 139
(2001) (investigating how Vasquez rejected the federal bright-line approach in favor of a factorbased “reasonable under all of the circumstances” analysis); Maryt L. Fredrickson, Note, Recent
Developments in Wyoming’s Reasonableness Requirement Applied to the Search Incident to Arrest Exception,
9 WYO. L. REV. 195 (2009) (analyzing how several cases have shaped the Wyoming deﬁnition of
reasonableness); Mervin Mecklenberg, Comment, Fixing O’Boyle v. State—Trafﬁc Detentions under
Wyoming’s Emerging Search-and-Seizure Standard, 7 WYO. L. REV. 69 (2007) (examining one of the
earliest decisions applying Wyoming’s “reasonable under all the circumstances” approach); .
78

See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text (outlining the separate holdings of Gant).

79

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714–15 (2009).

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.
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with two offenses: possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug
paraphernalia.83 Gant moved to suppress the evidence.84 The trial judge denied
Gant’s motion, and the jury convicted Gant of both offenses.85 After a lengthy set
of appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.86

Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Souter, Thomas, and Scalia.87 Justice Scalia issued a separate concurring opinion
critiquing the majority’s reasoning, but joined the majority to avoid creating a
plurality opinion.88 In its ﬁrst holding, the majority rejected broad State readings
of Belton as unconstitutionally expanding the search incident to arrest exception
to establish an automatic authorization of all searches of a suspect’s vehicle.89
Accordingly, the Court retethered Belton to the Chimel doctrine, rendering a
warrantless automobile search incident to arrest reasonable when the suspect is

Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3408 (2009) (possession of a narcotic drug for sale); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN § 13-3415(A) (2009) (possession of drug paraphernalia).
83

84
See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 1, State v. Gant, No. CR-20000042 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
Apr. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 34566317 (arguing the police conducted an unreasonable search incident
to arrest pursuant to Chimel since police had secured Gant in a police car prior to commencing
the search); Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 1, State v. Gant, No. CR-20000042
(Ariz. Super. Ct. May 18, 2000), 2000 WL 34566316 (contending Belton authorized the search
automatically since it commenced incident to Gant’s arrest).
85

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715; see also Minute Entry at 1, State v. Gant, No. CR-20000042
(Ariz. Super. Ct. June 5, 2000), 2000 WL 35630010 (denying Gant’s motion to suppress).
86
See, e.g., State v. Gant (Gant I ), 43 P.3d 188, 194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (determining
police unreasonably searched Gant’s vehicle because he presented no threat to either the police or to
the evidence in the vehicle, and the police should thus have obtained a warrant prior to initiating
the search); State v. Gant (Gant II ), 162 P.3d 640, 642 (Ariz. 2007) (holding the police search
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
87

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1713–14.

88

Id. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although Justice Scalia did not agree with the
majority’s reasoning, he chose to join with the majority opinion to prevent the confusion of a 4 to
1 to 4 split decision:
It seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come forth with a 4-to-1-to-4
opinion that leaves the governing rule uncertain. I am therefore confronted with
the choice of either leaving the current understanding of Belton and Thornton
in effect, or acceding to what seems to me the artiﬁcial narrowing of those cases
adopted by Justice Stevens. The latter, as I have said, does not provide the degree
of certainty I think desirable in this ﬁeld; but the former opens the ﬁeld to what I
think are plainly unconstitutional searches—which is the greater evil. I therefore
join the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 1725; see also infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Gant).
89

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719–20.
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“unsecured” and could gain access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle
and destroy evidence or brandish a weapon.90
In its second holding, the majority extended Gant beyond the Chimel doctrine
by adopting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton.91 In addition to the dual
interests of protecting ofﬁcers and the integrity of evidence articulated in Chimel,
a reasonable search incident to arrest includes a warrantless search commenced
when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.”92 The Court thus held the search of Gant’s car unreasonable
not only because Gant could not have destroyed evidence or wielded a weapon,
but also because the police could not have reasonably believed evidence related to
Gant’s crime of arrest—driving on a suspended license—was located in the car at
the time of the search.93

Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the judgment
but critiqued the majority’s reasoning.94 He argued the majority maintained
needless ties to Belton by retethering Belton to Chimel, thus requiring a suspect
to present a risk to evidence or ofﬁcers to invoke the rule.95 As an alternative
to Belton–Thornton, Justice Scalia proposed a partial return to probable cause,
which renders the Chimel analysis of a suspect’s spatial proximity to the vehicle
or potential threat to evidence or ofﬁcers moot.96 Under Justice Scalia’s proposed
alternative, while ofﬁcers could still commence a warrantless search of the suspect’s
vehicle for evidence of the crime of arrest, they would need probable cause to
search for evidence of other crimes.97

Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito wrote for the dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts, with Justice Breyer joining in part.98 Justice Alito criticized the majority
on multiple points, focusing on the majority’s critique of Belton.99 He argued

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

93

Id. (“Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related
evidence authorized the search in this case.”).
94

Id. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 1725.

98

Id. at 1726–32 (Alito, J., dissenting).

99

Id. at 1727.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 13

330

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

the majority in Belton meant solely to establish a bright-line rule allowing police
to search the passenger compartments of a suspect’s vehicle after every arrest.100
Moreover, Justice Alito contended the majority’s adoption of Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Thornton with little explanation will result in confusion as
to what constitutes reasonableness.101

Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion.102 According to Justice
Breyer, Gant failed to reach the burden necessary to overcome the presumption
of stare decisis and persuade the Court to overrule Belton.103 His opinion,
however, separated him from Justice Alito’s critique with respect to whether the
Gant majority’s reasoning was ﬂawed; he chose instead not to address the Gant
majority’s reasoning.104

ANALYSIS
The rule in Arizona v. Gant is another in a long line of attempts to delineate
reasonableness in automobile searches incident to arrest through the use of brightline rules.105 With each iteration of a bright-line rule, however, the particular
circumstances surrounding each disputed search have required the Court to
stretch each bright-line rule to accommodate factually complicated challenges.106
The Court in Thornton ultimately stretched the bright-line approach to the point
where law enforcement gained an entitlement allowing broad searches of vehicles
with neither probable cause nor a warrant.107 The Court in Gant attempted to
preserve the bright-line approach while addressing unconstitutionally broad

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 1725–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718–20 (2009); see also supra notes 20–59, 79–104 and accompanying
text (describing the history of the bright-line approach from its inception to the current ruling in
Gant).
106

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981); see also supra notes 30–59 and
accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the bright-line rule).
107

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620–21, 623–24 (2004); see also Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825 (1994) (acknowledging the
widely ﬂuctuating level of Fourth Amendment protection offered by the United States Supreme
Court).
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readings of Belton–Thornton, but instead created a two-part rule that frustrated
the purposes for which Belton –Thornton was originally adopted: clarity and
guidance for law enforcement.108
Applying Gant in practice will present numerous problems.109 In the ﬁrst
holding, the majority retethered Belton to the Chimel dual interests of protecting
ofﬁcer safety and the integrity of evidence.110 Lower courts never fully deﬁned
Chimel as applied to vehicles, and now courts must face the same issue.111 In the
second holding, recognizing the diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles,
the Court imposed the “reason to believe” standard.112 The Court has never fully
deﬁned reason to believe: some courts have deﬁned it as probable cause, and other
courts have deﬁned it as some lesser standard than probable cause.113

Neither Holding Provides Clarity
In its ﬁrst holding, the Gant majority retethered the Belton rule to the Chimel
immediate control test by limiting searches of vehicles incident to arrest to areas
within which a defendant could reach to access a weapon or destroy evidence.114
The majority modiﬁed Belton, however, without ﬁrst clarifying the required level
of spatial proximity between a defendant and a vehicle necessary to trigger the
rule.115 Instead, the holding stated a suspect must be “unsecured” and capable of

108

See infra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (arguing the Court in Gant established a
new bright-line test which lacks clarity and does not guide law enforcement as to the boundaries of
reasonableness in automobile searches incident to arrest).
109

See infra notes 110–13 and accompanying text (asserting Gant will prove difﬁcult for
practitioners to apply).
110

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719–20.

111

See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing ‘Bright
Lines’ and ‘Good Faith,’ 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 330 (1982) (discussing the Belton majority’s
assertion that the bright-line approach arose from a lack of a clear deﬁnition of Chimel as applied
to vehicles); infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text (contending the ﬁrst Gant holding remains
unclear until further litigation resolves the Chimel deﬁnition of “immediate control” as applied to
automobiles).
112

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719–20.

See The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 172, 181–82 (2009)
(noting neither Justice Scalia in Thornton nor the Gant majority deﬁned the reason to believe
standard); infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (critiquing the reason to believe standard and
outlining numerous cases utilizing different deﬁnitions of reason to believe).
113

114
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“Accordingly, we reject [the State’s] reading of Belton and hold
that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search.”); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
115

See Carson, supra note 39, at 1087–88 (describing the lack of a clear deﬁnition of the
required level of temporal or spatial proximity to trigger the Belton –Thornton rule); infra notes
116–18 and accompanying text (describing the lack of clarity in the ﬁrst Gant holding).
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physically reaching into the vehicle to destroy evidence or brandish a weapon.116
Courts have never fully deﬁned the level of spatial proximity necessary to satisfy
the immediate control test.117 Though Gant may serve to constrict readings of
Belton that allowed law enforcement complete access to a vehicle incident to an
arrest, the lack of a precise deﬁnition of necessary spatial proximity provides little
guidance to law enforcement.118
When the Gant majority adopted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Thornton as the second Gant holding, it did so without sufﬁciently explaining its
potential effects on evidentiary offenses.119 The concurring opinion in Thornton
addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained by a warrantless search incident
to arrest which commenced after the discovery of evidence in a separate, lawful
search of the defendant’s clothing.120 In contrast, the police arrested Gant for a
non-evidentiary offense, which Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton
did not speciﬁcally discuss.121 Rather than address evidentiary concerns, the
Gant majority applied the Thornton concurring opinion by concluding ofﬁcers
did not have reason to believe they could ﬁnd evidence of Gant’s crime in his
car, as the crime—driving on a suspended license—required no further evidence

116

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.

117

See Myron Moskowitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 657–58, 661, 667–78 (2002) (concluding the Chimel brightline rule fails to recognize the complex factual realities of searches, and as such is difﬁcult to clarify).
See Albert W. Aschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
227, 274 (1984) (noting the Belton bright-line rule arose because the United States Supreme Court
believed lower courts never resolved how to apply the Chimel immediate control test to vehicles);
Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court
to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 77, 96–97 (2007) (discussing how Belton arose from the lack of a clear deﬁnition of Chimel as
applied to vehicles).
118

119
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU and the ACLU of
Arizona in Support of Respondent at 21-22, Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 07-542) (arguing against
the adoption of an evidentiary rule to resolve the issues presented by Gant’s non-evidentiary
offense); Mark M. Neil, The Impact of Arizona v. Gant: Limiting the Scope of Automobile Searches?,
PROSECUTOR, June 2009, at 38 (opining about the potential situations in which the Gant rule may
or may not limit automobile searches); infra notes 120–28 and accompanying text (discussing the
lack of clarity in the second Gant holding).
120

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718–19.

121

Id. at 1712. The police arrested Gant for driving on a suspended license, which is a nonevidentiary offense because it only requires evidence of a suspect driving a vehicle while possessing
a suspended license. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3473 (2008); State v. Brown, 986 P.2d 239,
241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (describing the elements of driving on a suspended license). The police
could not have discovered any further evidence of driving on a suspended license in Gant’s car, since
evidence of the suspended license existed intangibly in police records, wholly apart from Gant’s
car. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718–19. In contrast, the police arrested Thornton for felony possession
of cocaine, which is an evidentiary offense because it requires tangible evidence of cocaine in the
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to prove its commission.122 The Gant majority’s application of Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Thornton to Gant’s case failed to address the ﬁner nuances
of evidentiary arrests, such as how ofﬁcers may demonstrate the reason to believe
standard based on the evidence discovered through a prior lawful search.123
Furthermore, the Gant majority adopted the unclear reason to believe
standard from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton without providing
sufﬁcient clariﬁcation.124 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton allows
ofﬁcers to conduct a warrantless search of the suspect’s vehicle incident to arrest of
the suspect when they have reason to believe the suspect’s car contains evidence of
the crime of arrest.125 Justice Scalia in Thornton did not deﬁne reason to believe.126
Since the Gant majority also failed to deﬁne the meaning of reason to believe, the
standard remains unclear: some courts have deﬁned reason to believe as probable
cause, and some courts have deﬁned it as some lesser standard.127 Clarifying
the precise deﬁnition of the reason to believe standard will thus require further
litigation.128
defendant’s possession. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631–32; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006);
United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 422 F.3d 65, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing how the quantity
of drugs possessed is an important element of the offense of felony possession of cocaine, which thus
requires evidence of the possession of the cocaine to demonstrate).
122

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.

123

Brief of the ACLU, supra note 119, at 25; infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text
(discussing the lack of clarity in the reason to believe standard).
124

See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (discussing the reason to believe standard).

125

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630–32; see also David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating
Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1287, 1344–45 (2005). Professor Rudstein reads the reason to believe standard in Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton as a “less-than-probable-cause” standard. Id. But see infra
notes 127–28 and accompanying text (discussing conﬂicting deﬁnitions of reason to believe).
126
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630–32. Justice Scalia did not explicitly deﬁne reason to believe,
but quoted a criminal procedure treatise published in 1872 which described reason to believe as a
justiﬁcation for ofﬁcers to search an arrestee. Id. at 630 (quoting 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 211, at 127 (2d ed. 1872)).
127

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 (adopting Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton without
deﬁning reason to believe); see, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (referring to
probable cause as a “reasonable ground for belief ”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 n.7 (1983)
(citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36 (1963) (ﬁnding probable cause to search based on a
reasonable belief Ker was in possession of marijuana)); Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism
and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299, 362 (2002) (explaining how some commentators,
model procedural codes and legal institutes equate “reasonable cause to believe” and probable
cause). But see, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–92, 394–95 (1982) (discussing how
the presence of probable cause to search vehicles would trigger the automobile exception); United
States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying “reasonable belief ” as a lesser standard
than probable cause); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (interpreting both
standards as separate and distinct).
128

See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631–32 (describing a suspect’s reduced
privacy interest in his vehicle, and thus the lower degree of suspicion required to initiate a search);
see also, e.g., United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 136 n.15 (4th Cir. 2009) (referencing an
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In addition, the Gant rule fails to protect privacy interests.129 The majority
in Gant held the “circumstances unique to the vehicle context” justiﬁed the
adoption of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton, which likely refers
to the lesser privacy interest afforded to vehicles due to their mobile and public
nature.130 However, searches of suspects’ vehicles must adhere to the constitutional
protection of even reduced expectations of privacy.131 The Belton–Thornton brightline approach resulted in no protection of privacy interests.132 Gant lacks a precise,
clear deﬁnition; it therefore provides scant guidance to law enforcement and will
prove incapable of protecting privacy rights until further litigation deﬁnes the
unclear terms in both holdings.133

ofﬁcer’s probable cause to search to distinguish the Gant reason to believe standard); People v.
Osborne, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (applying the Gant reason to believe
standard by referring to a separate search of the defendant’s clothing). But see, e.g., James J. Franklin,
Payton’s Probable Cause: Why Probable Cause and “Reason to Believe” Represent and Should Represent
the Same Reasonableness Standard, 70 U. PITT. L. REV 487, 489–98 (2009) (arguing probable cause
and reason to believe function as the same standard); Michael A. Rabasa, Comment, Payton v.
New York: Is “Reason to Believe” Probable Cause or a Lesser Standard?, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
437, 441–50 (2009) (discussing conﬂicting deﬁnitions of reason to believe as applied to Fourth
Amendment analyses of arrests); supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing the lack of
clarity in the deﬁnition of reason to believe).
129
See infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text (contending the Gant rule will not
adequately protect privacy interests in automobiles).
130

Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631–32; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 298–99
(1999) (determining passengers in vehicles have reduced privacy interests while in vehicles); Carney,
471 U.S. at 391–92 (referencing the public nature of vehicles and the heavy regulation of vehicular
travel as justiﬁcations for a reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles); Gerald A. Ashdown, The
Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 753, 766–68 (2006) (discussing the lesser privacy interests afforded to defendants in vehicles).
131
See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 (stating searches of vehicles must respect even reduced privacy
interests); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 (1998) (ﬁnding circumstances surrounding
a search of a vehicle incident to arrest must fall into well-deﬁned exceptions to justify invading a
defendant’s implicit privacy interests).
132
See Peter W. Fenton, Search & Seizure Commentary, CHAMPION, July 2009, at 51 (drawing a
parallel between the Belton–Thornton bright-line approach and older British general warrants which
allowed for broad, sweeping invasions of privacy).
133

See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716, 1719 (adopting the Chimel immediate control test and
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton); Aschuler, supra note 118, at 274 (discussing how
the Court has never fully deﬁned the Chimel immediate control test); Kit Kinports, Diminishing
Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 651 (2009) (criticizing Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton); Dale Anderson & Hon. Dave Cole, Search & Seizure After
Arizona v. Gant, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2009, at 15–18 (pontiﬁcating about numerous issues which
parties must litigate to clarify both Gant holdings); supra notes 114–33 and accompanying text
(outlining the lack of clarity in both Gant holdings and the need for further litigation to deﬁne
ambiguous terms).
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The two Gant holdings rely on unclear reasoning.134 By retethering Belton
to the Chimel dual interests of ofﬁcer safety and evidence preservation, the ﬁrst
holding resurrected the immediate control test, which courts have never fully
deﬁned in the context of automobiles.135 In the second holding, the majority
arbitrarily adopted the reason to believe standard of suspicion without explaining
the deﬁnition of the standard or how it applies.136

Probable Cause Solves the Issues
For decades, courts addressed searches of vehicles with two separate
standards, depending upon whether ofﬁcers arrested suspects prior to initiating
searches or ofﬁcers possessed probable cause to search.137 The automobile search
incident to arrest doctrine began as a doctrine meant to simplify the application
of Chimel to vehicles, but has now resulted in Gant—a confusing two-part rule
requiring further litigation to clarify.138 Courts must instead cease the use of two
separate standards and adopt probable cause—thereby triggering the automobile
exception—as the sole standard for automobile searches in all situations.139
Probable cause operates as a simple, straightforward standard, deﬁned by
decades of case law.140 With few exceptions, probable cause governs all searches,

134

See supra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (critiquing the two Gant holdings).

135

See LaFave, supra note 111, at 330 (discussing how the United States Supreme Court
decided Belton based on a belief that lower courts never deﬁned Chimel as applied to vehicles);
supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have never fully deﬁned the
immediate control test).
136

See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 133, at 651 (arguing Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Thornton lacks clarity); Rudstein, supra note 125, at 1344–45 (critiquing Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Thornton); supra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (arguing both Gant holdings
provide scant guidance to law enforcement).
137
Compare Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720–22 (limiting Belton solely to areas in which an unsecured
suspect could grab weapons or destroy evidence, as well as allowing searches of vehicles incident to
arrest when ofﬁcers have reason to believe evidence of the crime of the arrest exists in the vehicle)
and Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620–21 (expanding Belton to allow searches of entire vehicles regardless
of the suspect’s proximity to the vehicle) and Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61 (creating the ﬁrst brightline rule allowing searches of areas into which a “recent occupant” of a vehicle could reach) with
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298 (allowing ofﬁcers who have probable cause to believe evidence exists in
the vehicle to search the entire vehicle—including the belongings of all passengers—without further
restrictions on where in the vehicle they may search).
138

See supra notes 60–77 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the automobile
search incident to arrest doctrine); supra notes 114–36 and accompanying text (critiquing both
holdings in Gant).
139
See infra notes 140–54 and accompanying text (advocating for the adoption of probable
cause and the automobile exception as the alternative to Gant).
140

See infra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (arguing probable cause operates as a
straightforward standard, as opposed to the search incident to arrest doctrine, which remains vague).
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regardless of whether the search targets a person, home, or vehicle.141 It serves as
the deﬁnitive standard when balancing a suspect’s expectation of privacy and the
interests of law enforcement.142 An extensive number of cases fully inform law
enforcement of the nature of probable cause and its application to automobile
searches.143 When law enforcement ofﬁcers possess probable cause to search a
vehicle, they satisfy the traditional constitutional standard to initiate searches,
and can thus commence a presumably reasonable search.144 Courts determine
probable cause by analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding a search
from the objective position of a reasonable law enforcement ofﬁcial at the time
of the arrest.145 This test is ﬂexible because courts must analyze each challenge
separately based on the facts of each individual search.146 In contrast, the federal
bright-line approach has proven incapable of addressing the factual intricacies of
Fourth Amendment challenges, leading courts to adopt unconstitutionally broad
or vague standards entitling law enforcement to search vehicles with little to no
required level of suspicion.147
141
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (referring to probable cause as the “textual and
traditional standard” for searches); Brief of the ACLU, supra note 119, at 25.
142
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (referring to probable cause as the
“minimum requirement” for a constitutional, reasonable search); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 11 (2009) (detailing probable cause).
143
See, e.g., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 306–07 (holding when law enforcement has probable
cause to search a suspect’s vehicle for evidence, they may reasonably search all compartments and
the contents of passenger belongings in the vehicle); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982) (expanding the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
allow searches of vehicles and vehicular compartments without a warrant if ofﬁcers have probable
cause sufﬁcient to obtain a warrant at the time of the search); see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.2
(outlining numerous cases which deﬁne probable cause historically and practically, as well as how to
demonstrate probable cause existed at the time of a search).
144

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (holding searches and seizures
are presumed reasonable when police have probable cause); see also, e.g., United States v. Coleman,
458 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding a search reasonable under Whren since the ofﬁcers had
probable cause to search); United States v. Tovar-Valdivia, 193 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999)
(referring to Whren when determining an ofﬁcer did not have probable cause and thus did not
commence a reasonable seizure).
145

See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233 (determining probable cause operates as a “totality of the
circumstances” inquiry); Lawrence Rosenthal, Probability, Probable Cause, and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 63, 63–66 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/
ﬁles/seealso/vol87/pdf/87TexasLRevSeeAlso63.pdf (discussing the probable cause standard).
146
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233 (establishing the fact-based “totality of the circumstances”
approach to determining probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 170, 175 (1949) (“In
dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”); The Warrant Requirement, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 21, 23 n.59 (2009) (discussing the Gates “totality of the circumstances” approach to
probable cause).
147

See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620–21 (expanding the Belton “recent occupant” test to allow
searches to commence after suspects exited vehicles of their own volition, resulting in carte blanche
access to search the suspect’s entire vehicle incident to arrest); Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61 (expanding
the Chimel immediate control test to include passenger areas into which “recent occupants” of a
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Adopting the automobile exception as the alternative to Gant simultaneously
protects privacy interests while enabling law enforcement total access to vehicles,
without the need for further litigation.148 When searches of vehicles commence
with probable cause, numerous cases deﬁne the boundaries of reasonableness.149
The probable cause automobile exception explicated in Ross–Acevedo–Houghton
addresses the problems in Gant by allowing thorough searches of vehicles while
simultaneously recognizing and protecting a suspect’s privacy interests.150 After
circumstances surrounding the search give rise to probable cause, Houghton
allows law enforcement to search the suspect’s entire vehicle, including closed
compartments and the contents of passenger belongings.151 Since Houghton
allows ofﬁcers possessing probable cause total access to a vehicle under the
automobile exception, law enforcement requires no further litigation to
understand the boundaries of reasonableness after commencing the search.152
Gant cannot currently protect privacy interests, however, since the two holdings
remain unclear and require further litigation to clarify.153 Adopting probable cause
through the automobile exception as the sole standard for automobile searches
thus simultaneously protects the privacy interests of suspects while enabling law
enforcement to thoroughly search for evidence.154
vehicle could reach); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (limiting the area of a search incident to arrest to
the area solely within the immediate control of the suspect in order to protect ofﬁcers from hidden
weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence).
148
See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text (contending courts must adopt the
automobile exception to protect privacy interests).
149

See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text (explaining probable cause).

150

See Brief of the ACLU, supra note 119, at 19–20 (arguing the Fourth Amendment requires
the government to have probable cause to justiﬁably infringe on a suspect’s privacy interests); Donald
A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a
Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 381–84, 406–07 (2004) (discussing the high degree
of suspicion required to search under the automobile exception, and how the search incident to
arrest exception erodes the privacy protections offered by probable cause); infra notes 151–54 and
accompanying text (discussing the thorough searches allowed under Houghton).
151
See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298 (holding the automobile exception allows law enforcement
to search the belongings of passengers); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991)
(expanding the automobile exception to include closed passenger compartments capable of
concealing contraband); Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (holding the automobile exception allows ofﬁcers
who possess sufﬁcient probable cause to obtain a warrant may search an entire vehicle including the
trunk since a warrant would authorize the search of those areas).
152
See Michele M. Jochner, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment Rulings Expand
Police Discretion, 88 ILL. B.J. 576, 580–81 (2000) (noting Houghton expands police discretion
to search passenger belongings, but remains limited by probable cause); Walter M. Hudson, A
Few New Developments in the Fourth Amendment, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1999, at 39 (discussing how
Houghton authorizes meticulous searches while still remaining restricted by probable cause).
153

See supra notes 114–33 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clarity in the Chimel
immediate control test and the unclear deﬁnition of the reason to believe standard in Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Thornton).
154
See United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 155–57, 162 (1924) (establishing the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but maintaining probable
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CONCLUSION
In the ﬁrst Gant holding, the majority retethered Belton to the Chimel dual
interests of ofﬁcer safety and evidence preservation.155 In the second Gant holding,
the majority extended the rule beyond Chimel by allowing searches to commence
if ofﬁcers have reason to believe evidence of the crime of the arrest exists in the
vehicle at the time of the search.156 The Court has never fully deﬁned Chimel
as applied to vehicles.157 The Court also adopted the reason to believe standard
without explaining its precise deﬁnition.158 By doing so, the Gant ruling fails to
protect privacy interests since clarifying both holdings requires further litigation.159
As an alternative, the automobile exception explicated in Ross–Acevedo–Houghton
solves the problems in Gant by protecting privacy interests while simultaneously
providing total guidance to law enforcement.160 When ofﬁcers possess probable
cause that evidence exists in a suspect’s vehicle, they may search the entire vehicle,
including all compartments and the contents of passenger belongings.161 While
the automobile exception allows for thorough searches, it remains limited by
probable cause, which properly balances privacy interests with the government’s
need to search.162 Since Gant fails to protect privacy interests, courts must protect
these interests by adopting the automobile exception as the sole standard for
automobile searches.163

cause as the required level of suspicion); Davis A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death
on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 565–70 (1998) (discussing the automobile exception,
which commences with probable cause sufﬁcient to obtain a warrant, and the search incident to
arrest exception, which offers little to no protection of privacy); Thomas B. McAffee, John P. Lukens
& Thaddeus J. Yurek III, The Automobile Exception in Nevada: A Critique of the Harnisch Cases, 8
NEV. L.J. 622, 646 (2008) (observing the automobile exception provides greater privacy protection
to suspects than the search incident to arrest exception).
155

See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing the ﬁrst Gant holding).

156

See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing the second Gant holding).

157

See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text (contending courts have never deﬁned the
Chimel immediate control test).
158

See supra notes 119–28 and accompanying text (arguing neither Justice Stevens in Gant nor
Justice Scalia in Thornton deﬁned reason to believe).
159

See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (contending Gant cannot protect privacy
rights since both holdings are unclear).
160
See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (advocating for the adoption of probable
cause and the automobile exception as the sole standard for automobile searches).
161
See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text (explaining the boundaries of reasonableness
deﬁned in Houghton).
162
See supra notes 137–47 and accompanying text (arguing probable cause protects privacy
interests while enabling law enforcement to thoroughly search the vehicles of suspects).
163
See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (concluding the automobile exception
should operate as the sole standard for vehicle searches).
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